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Introduction
The First World War was the greatest test for the cohesion of the British 
Empire after the first Dominions came into being.2 The Empire entered the 
war as one single entity as the Dominions were still formally subordinated 
to their mother country. The Dominions had the right to decide about the 
extent of their involvement in the war effort; however, as a result of various 
pre-war agreements, their fleets and expeditionary forces found themselves 
under the command of the British Admiralty and the Supreme Military 
Command.3 Although the Dominions’ military deployment was below the 
level of their mother country, their help was everything but negligible.4 
Losses and victories of these overseas countries, symbolized by the heroism 
of Australians and New Zealanders during the Gallipoli Operation, of 
Canadians at Passchendaele and Vimy Ridge, and of South Africans during 
the conquest of German Southwest and East Africa, deeply entered the 
collective memory of the Dominions. In addition, they accelerated local 
1 This article has been published as a part of the research project PRVOUK „Historie 
v interdisciplinární perspektivě” (scientific discipline AB – history; coordinator: Prof. 
PhDr. Ivan Šedivý, CSc.), partial project „Evropa a (versus) svět: Interkontinentální a 
vnitrokontinentální politické, ekonomické, sociální, kulturní a intelektuální transfery a jejich 
důsledky” (leading project researcher: Prof. PhDr. Josef Opatrný, CSc.).
2 See H. E. EGERTON, The War and the British Dominions, Oxford [1914].
3 N. MANSERGH, The Commonwealth Experience, London 1969, p. 166.
4 C. E. CARRINGTON, The Empire at War, 1914–1918, in: The Cambridge History of the 
British Empire: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870–1919, Vol. 3, Cambridge 1967, pp. 641–642.
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nationalism, weakened imperial patriotism and deepened their desire for 
independent policies.5
The British Government assured the Dominions that they would have 
the possibility to discuss the form of the postwar peace settlement already 
in 1915.6 Yet, the promise was not always kept. In mid-November 1918, for 
example, the Australian Prime Minister, William “Billy” Morris Hughes, 
complained that President Woodrow Wilson’s so-called Fourteen Points were 
adopted by the British Cabinet without consulting the Dominions about the 
issue.7 The Dominions felt particularly threatened by the U.S. “open door 
policy” and “free seas” principle and hoped these would not be enforced. 
This was especially the case when it came to former German colonies as they 
were somewhat in opposition to British imperial policy which, on its part, was 
introducing the imperial preference system bit by bit.8
*
Shortly after declaring truce, representatives of the British Government and 
of the Dominions discussed the question of the Dominions’ status at the Peace 
Conference. From the very beginning, Leopold Amery tried to push through the 
idea that the Dominions together with India should have direct representation. 
Furthermore, he was convinced that the overseas autonomous polities should 
be viewed as equal partners of their mother country and, consequently, should 
be free to express their opinion on all issues of the peace arrangements, not only 
5 A. MAY, The Round Table and Imperial Federation, 1910–17, in: The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 410, 2010, p. 553.
6 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 71, 14th April, 
1915, cc. 16–17.
7 The British Library (hereafter BL), Balfour Papers (hereafter BP), Add MS 49775, Vol. 
XCIII, L. S. Amery, Representation of the Dominion at the Peace Negotiations, 14th November, 
1918, ff. [191–192].
8 The National Archives (hereafter TNA), Cabinet Papers (hereafter CAB) 23/42/19, Imperial 




on those that directly affected them.9 The British Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George sympathized with the aspirations of the Dominions’ representatives. 
Nevertheless, he originally assumed that five seats would be sufficient for 
the British Empire Delegation. However, the Dominions, with regard to their 
war effort, openly demanded separate representation.10 As a consequence, 
dual representation for the Dominions and India came into being: firstly, as 
members of the British Empire Delegation and, secondly, as members of the 
warring parties that were able, because of their special interests, to send two 
delegates forth to the meeting.11
Nonetheless, the Dominions were subject to certain limitations. They 
could not vote separately for instance as the British Empire was to act, at least 
on the outside, as a single “political entity” with a unified view.12 The dual 
representation of the Dominions rose the question what the actual position 
of the Dominions at the Paris Peace Conference was. Compared to their 
European allies, representatives of the Dominions had a significant advantage. 
9 University of Cambridge: Churchill College: Churchill Archives Centre (hereafter CAC), 
Amery Papers (further only AP)AMEL 2/1/1, Representation of the Dominions at the Peace 
Negotiations, 14th November, 1918, ff. [s. p.].
10 Cf. R. L. BORDEN, Canada and the Peace: A Speech on the Treaty of Peace, Delivered 
in the Canadian House of Commons on Tuesday, September 2, 1919, [Ottawa 1919], p. 13; 
L. F. FITZHARDINGE, Hughes, Borden and Dominion Representation at the Paris Peace 
Conference, in: The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1968, pp. 163–169; D. 
LLOYD GEORGE, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, Vol. 1, London 1938, p. 205; F. S. 
MARSTON, The Peace Conference of 1919: Organisation and Procedure, London 1944, 
pp. 37, 51; C. P. STACEY, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External 
Policies: 1867–1921, Vol. 1, Toronto 1984, pp. 270–274; TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 
1, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes of a Meeting of Members of the 
British Empire Delegation, Villa Majestic, Paris, 13th January, 1919, f. [1].
11 Canada, Australia and South Africa were able to send forth two delegates, India one as a 
representative of British India and one as a representative of the native states, New Zealand 
had only one delegate and Newfoundland had no delegate at all. L. F. FITZHARDINGE, W. 
M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles 1919, in: Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 
Vol. 5, Is. 2, 1967, p. 133; TNA, CAB 29/7, W. C. P. [No.] 5, British Empire Delegation: Note 
by the Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet, 13th January, 1919, f. [25].
12 Cf. A. B. KEITH, War Government of the British Dominions, Oxford 1921, p. 151; TNA, 
CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 1, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes of a 
Meeting of Members of the British Empire Delegation, Villa Majestic, Paris, 13th January, 
1919, f. 3.
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As members of the British Empire Delegation they had access to confidential 
materials and conclusions of the Council of Ten and of the Council of Five. 
Therefore, they were able to express their opinion on all key issues that were 
being debated at the conference.13
Specific interests of the Dominions became obvious when it came to 
the question of dividing former German colonies in Africa and in the Pacific 
and of the associated creation of the Mandate System under the League of 
Nations. Indeed, Australia sought to annex German Pacific islands whereas 
South Africans were interested in German Southwest Africa.14 Already during 
the war, Australia continuously highlighted the need to prevent the spread of 
Japanese influence southwards.15 For this reason, negotiations about a mutual 
British-Japanese understanding concerning the future organization of German 
territories in the Far East and the Pacific took place in February 1917.16 
Several Australian politicians initially suggested that the best thing for the 
future of German New Guinea and the Solomon Islands would be if the United 
States took over the administration of the territories in concern.17 Eventually, 
however, Australia’s and New Zealand’s statesmen reached the conclusion 
13 Cf. J. W. DAFOE, Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919, in: The Canadian Historical 
Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1943, pp. 237–240; A. I. INGLIS, Loring C. Christie and the Imperial 
Idea: 1919–1926, in: Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue d’études canadiennes, Vol. 7, No. 
2, 1972, p. 21; MANSERGH, p. 179.
14 Cf. W. R. LOUIS, Australia and the German Colonies in the Pacific, 1914–1919, in: Journal 
of Modern History, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1966, pp. 407–421; TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 
4, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes of a Meeting of Members of the 
British Empire Delegation, Villa Majestic, Paris, 27th January, 1919, f. [1]; ibidem, CAB 29/1, 
P. 34, Peace Conference: Memorandum Respecting German Colonies, January 1919, ff. [1]–
20.
15 TNA, CAB 23/43/2, Procès-verbal of the Second Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, 22th 
March, 1917, f. 3.
16 Understanding between Great Britain and Japan regarding ultimate Disposal of German 
Rights, February [16], 1921, in: J. V. A. MacMURRAY, (Ed.), Treaties and Agreements with 
and Concerning China, 1894–1919: Republican Period (1912–1919), Vol. 2, New York 1921, 
pp. 1167–1168.
17 R. C. SNELLING, Peacemaking 1919: Australia, New Zealand and the British Empire 
Delegation at Versailles, in: The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 4, No. 
1, 1975, pp. 17–18.
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that former German territories should be in the hands of Great Britain or some 
other friendly country.18
On 29 January 1919, the British Empire Delegation discussed the draft 
of the resolution on former German and Ottoman territories. Because the 
American President Woodrow Wilson rejected the principle of annexation, 
a compromise solution was adopted. The territories in questions were divided 
into three different categories (labelled as A, B and C) and were to become 
trust territories of the League of Nations. During the discussions, Lloyd George 
pointed out that he did not want the Japanese to participate in the administration 
of the trust territories. The proposed restrictions on the exercise of the mandate 
did not satisfy the Australian Prime Minister, Hughes, who, because of the 
administration of British New Guinea, was accustomed to a different degree 
of authority in the field of trade and immigrant policy. Moreover, it should 
be borne in mind that he likewise treated the Japanese with a considerable 
amount of antipathy.19 A British representative, Sir Maurice Hankey, reassured 
Hughes that the purpose of establishing the Class C Mandate was basically 
forming a “lease for 999 years”.20 Lloyd George, on the other hand, tried to 
convince Hughes that “there was virtually no difference between the Class C 
Mandate and open annexation”.21
On 6 February 1919 Hughes presented an important memorandum 
specifying the position of Australia on the issue of islands in the South 
Pacific. Hughes once again openly expressed his concerns about the Japanese 
population preponderance. He even called the matter as “evil” and overtly 
raised racial issues and the need to continue with the practice of “white 
18 Cf. Administration of Samoa, in: The New Zealand Herald, Vol. 55, Is. 17073, 31st January, 
1919; Our Share, in: Auckland Star, Vol. 50, Is. 25, 29th January, 1919, p. 4; SNELLING, p. 18.
19 FITZHARDINGE, W. M. Hughes, p. 136; M. P. A. HANKEY, The Supreme Control at the 
Paris Peace Conference, London 1963, pp. 58–59; TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 6, Peace 
Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes of a Meeting of Members of the British 
Empire Delegation, Rue Nitot, Paris, 29th January, 1919, f. [1].
20 C. BRIDGE, William Hughes: Australia, London 2011, p. 80.
21 D. D: JONES, The Foreign Policy of William Morris Hughes of Australia, in: Far Eastern 
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1943, p. 158.
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politics” as in the case of British New Guinea.22 A few days later he sent 
another memorandum, in which he expressed doubts whether the League of 
Nations would have the power to deter the Japanese from their expansionist 
plans. He also criticized the proposed principles, especially the limits of 
mandate administration.23 The Australian Minister for the Navy, Sir Joseph 
Cook, made use of the negotiations and during a meeting that took place on 
20 February 1919 he presented his request stating it should be forbidden to 
build armed forces in the mandate areas. He feared that Japan could take 
advantage of the situation and use the territories in concern as enemy bases.24 
Australian demands provoked fear among some of the British delegates that 
such uncompromising attitudes could cause the failure of the peace talks.25 
Last but not least, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Vincent Massey was not 
happy about the unwillingness of the Australians to support efforts to gain 
control over Samoa and the country’s unwillingness to act in the issue of 
administrating Nauru26 where both of the Pacific Dominions had primarily 
economic interests.27 The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord 
Milner, held the opinion that it would be beneficial for Great Britain, for 
practical reasons, if Australia and New Zealand participated in the mandate 
system in the Pacific.
22 TNA, CAB 29/7, W. C. P. [No.] 71, W. M. Hughes, Australia and the Pacific Islands, 6th 
February, 1919, ff. 1–5, [584–588]. To importance “White Policy” cf. Australia, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, No. 37, 10th September, 1919, pp. 12174–12176.
23 TNA, CAB 29/8, W. C. P. [No.] 116, W. M. Hughes, Memorandum Regarding the Pacific 
Islands, 8th February, 1919, ff. 1–4.
24 TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 9, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes 
of a Meeting of Members of the British Empire Delegation, Villa Majestic, Paris, 20th February, 
1919, f. 2.
25 FITZHARDINGE, W. M. Hughes, p. 137.
26 To the problems Nauru see TNA, CAB 29/9, W. C. P. [No.] 240, W. M. Hughes to Walter 
H. Long, 3rd January, 1919, f. [313]; ibidem, CAB 29/7, W. C. P. [No.] 97, W. F. Massey, New 
Zealand and the Pacific Islands, 14th February, 1919, ff. 1–2, [761]; ibidem, CAB 29/9, W. C. 
P. [No.] 240, W. M. Hughes, The Control of Nauru under the Mandatory System, 13th March, 
1919, f. [312]; ibidem, CAB 29/10, W. C. P. [No.] 345, W. M. Hughes, The Control of Nauru, 
21st March, 1919, f. [173].
27 SNELLING, pp. 16, 20, 23.
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On 3 April 1919 the British Empire Delegates discussed Milner’s 
memorandum of March 8,28 which contained notes and remarks on Article XIX 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations dealing with mandate administration. 
Australia, South Africa and New Zealand were mostly concerned about 
those passages that focused on the Class C Mandate as they concentrated on 
small areas with sparse populations that were isolated from civilization. It 
was believed that this would defend best the interests of the local inhabitants. 
Milner did not think that their administration would be too demanding and, 
therefore, he agreed with the fact that these territories would have a small 
degree of autonomy. In addition, Milner also approved Japan’s participation 
in the administration of former German territories north of the Equator and he 
likewise discussed the problematic status of the Island of Nauru.29 However, 
he expressed certain doubts about the effectiveness of the sixth paragraph 
of Article XIX of the Covenant that enabled the integration of the mandate 
into the area belonging to the mandate power. In this context, he additionally 
highlighted possible complications that could arise if the inhabitants of the 
administered area decided to become independent.30 Furthermore, Australia, 
in general, intended to continue with the implementation of “white politics” in 
New Guinea whereas the Japanese repeatedly made demands that the “open 
door” principle should be respected in the case of the territories in concern.31
Indeed, the new status of the Dominions at the Paris Peace Conference 
and their special interests were simultaneously expressed during negotiations 
about a new international organization – the League of Nations. Nevertheless, 
28 TNA, CAB 29/9, W. C. P. [No.] 211, Lord Milner, Mandates: Under Clause XIX of the Draft 
“Covenant” of the League of Nations, 8th March, 1919, ff. [1]–13, [99–111].
29 TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 16, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes 
of a Meeting of Members of the British Empire Delegation, Hotel Majestic, Paris, 3rd April, 
1919, ff. 7–9.
30 Srv. TNA, CAB 29/9, W. C. P. [No.] 211, Lord Milner, Mandates: Under Clause XIX of 
the Draft “Covenant” of the League of Nations, 8th March, 1919, f. 4, [102]; ibidem, W. C. 
P. [No.] 211A, W. M. Hughes, Mandates: New Clause 6 for Typical Mandate Class “C”, 14th 
March, 1919, f. [112].
31 See BL, BP, Add MS 49734, Vol. LII, C. J. B. Hurst, ‘B’ and ‛C’ Mandates: Memorandum 
on the Present Position, 20th July, 1920, ff. [203–205].
Jaroslav Valkoun
Great Britain, the Dominions and the Paris Peace Conference
152
the first American proposal of the Covenant did not count with providing 
membership for the Dominions, Australians and New Zealanders, on the other 
hand, did not show much interest in the issue either.32 Yet, the Dominions were 
devoted to talk over the matter at the Imperial War Cabinet33 even though the 
Canadian memorandum dealing with the possible form of the organization 
was not discussed.34 However, no “Dominion text,” in fact, had a greater 
impact than the so-called Smuts’ pamphlet about the League of Nations of 
December 1918.
South African General Jan Christiaan Smuts spoke several times in 
favour of establishing an international organization that would replace the 
Great Powers in the postwar era in the matter of monitoring compliance 
with international law and universal peace between nations.35 He even did so 
already in 1917. Indeed, the organization was to take up the position of the 
world powers that had failed to ensure peace when they allowed the outbreak 
of the war. Moreover, Winston Churchill pointed out that the League could 
only function properly if there was a certain agreement and understanding 
between Britain, France and the United States.36 Milner also stressed the need 
to coordinate actions of the Allies, especially in the case of the Americans.37
On 20 March 1918 the Committee of Sir Walter Phillimore, with 
whom Lord Robert Cecil, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
32 F. H. SOWARD, Sir Robert Borden and Canada’s External Policy, 1911–1920, in: Report of 
the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association / Rapports annuels de la Société 
historique du Canada, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1941, p. 78.
33 K. C. WHEARE, The Empire and the Peace Treaties 1918–1921, in: The Cambridge 
History of the British Empire: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870–1919, Vol. 3, Cambridge 
1967, p. 652.
34 G. P. GLAZEBROOK de T., Canada at the Paris Peace Conference, Toronto 1942, pp. 
60–61.
35 Cf. G. CURRY, Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, and the Versailles Settlement, in: The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1961, p. 969; A. LENTIN, General Smuts: South Africa, 
London 2010, p. 52; TNA, CAB 23/40/12, Imperial War Cabinet, [No.] 46: Minutes of a 
Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet 26th April, 1917, f. 9.
36 TNA, CAB 23/42/18, Imperial War Cabinet, [No.] 46: Minutes of a Meeting of the Imperial 
War Cabinet, 24th December, 1918, f. 4–7.
37 TNA, CAB 29/1, P. 28, Report of Committee on Terms of Peace, 24th April, 1917, f. 3.
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and a great supporter of establishing the League, cooperated, presented an 
internal report to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Arthur 
James Balfour, on what the Covenant should look like.38 A following, final 
report of early July was extended and included a detailed analysis of various 
old and new peace projects.39 At the same time, an official group in France 
led by Leon Bourgeois40 published its own idea of the League of Nations 
on 8 June 1918.41 However, Lord Phillimore was highly critical of it. A few 
months later, on 5 October, Robert Cecil also drafted a memorandum about 
the role and position of the League of Nations for the War Cabinet. He did so 
at the request of the Prime Minister himself. Lord Cecil analyzed the whole 
matter from a somewhat visionary perspective and, therefore, was not able 
to present a realistic proposal that would include an exact structure of the 
organization.42 Lloyd George was not satisfied with either of the proposals, 
and for this reason he asked Smuts to prepare his own point of view on the 
issue under scrutiny.43
On 16 December 1918, consequently, Smuts published his own 
“practical proposal” about the League of Nations with the support of the British 
Government. It was to represent the heir of the values of devastated Europe.44 
Matters concerning former territories of the Ottoman Empire, Russia and 
Austria-Hungary, were to be based on the principle of “no annexations and 
self-determination of nations”. As for the question of Alsace and Lorraine, 
38 See R. CECIL, A Great Experiment: An Autobiography, London 1941, p. 60; RAFFO, P., 
The League of Nations Philosophy of Lord Robert Cecil, in: Australian Journal of Politics 
& History, Vol. 20, Is. 2, 1974, pp. 186–196; TNA, CAB 29/1, P. 26, The Committee on the 
League of Nations: Interim Report, 20th March, 1918, ff. [1]–7.
39 TNA, CAB 29/1, P. 26, The Committee on the League of Nations: Final Report, 3rd July, 
1918, ff. [1]–24.
40 See L. V. A. BOURGEOIS, Pour la société des nations, Paris 1910.
41 TNA, CAB 29/1, P. 28, Report of the Committee Appointed by the French Government, 9th 
August, 1918, ff. [1]–7.
42 TNA, CAB 29/1, P. 29, War Cabinet: League of Nations: Memorandum by Lord R. Cecil, 
5th October, 1918, ff. [253–273].
43 CURRY, p. 969.
44 WHEARE, p. 653.
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he recognized the legitimate claim of France, and in the case of former 
German African and Pacific territories, “occupied by barbarians unable to 
rule themselves,” he admitted that the idea of self-determination could be 
somewhat impractical.45 Smuts, therefore, ranked among firm supporters of 
mandate administration from the outset.46
Smuts’s main benefit, however, lied in the way how he regarded future 
relations between nations. Taking into consideration the experience and the 
development of the British Empire, Smuts held the view that relations between 
nations should be based on the principles of political freedom and equality, 
broad autonomy, political decentralization, allowing the existence of small 
nations, and “finally an institution like the League of Nations, which […] 
will guarantee the weak against the strong”.47 Smuts’ vision of international 
relations sparked interest in President Wilson who was especially interested 
in the designed structure of the organization and who modified some of the 
proposed points.48 Smuts believed that it would be beneficial for the British 
Empire if its representatives and the Americans held close opinions about the 
issue. In fact, this was exactly what happened.49 The Canadian Prime Minister, 
Sir Robert Laird Borden, was of a similar view as Smuts whereas Hughes 
looked at Wilson’s intentions with deep suspicion.50 In addition, the Australian 
Prime Minister, for instance, was convinced that the general’s concept of the 
League of Nations would further deepen the bond between Britain and foreign 
countries than between the Dominions and their mother country.51
45 J. C. SMUTS, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, London 1918, pp. 12–15.
46 D. H. MILLER, The Drafting of Covenant, Vol. 1, New York 1928, p. 38.
47 Cf. SMUTS, pp. 27–28; WHEARE, p. 653.
48 R. S. BAKER, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. 1, New York 1922, pp. 225–228.
49 To the British-American cooperation see P. KERR, The British Empire, the League 
of Nations, and the United States, in: The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 10, Is. 38, 1920, pp. 221–253.
50 M. BELOFF, Imperial Sunset: Britain’s Liberal Empire 1897–1921, Vol. 1, London 1969, 
p. 281.
51 TNA, CAB 23/42/18, Imperial War Cabinet, [No.] 46: Minutes of a Meeting of the Imperial 
War Cabinet, 24th December, 1918, f. 12.
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The British and American delegations worked together to prepare the 
final version of the Covenant of the League of Nations from early January 
1919.52 On 3 February 1919 the British legal adviser Sir Cecil Hurst and his 
U.S. counterpart David Hunter Miller prepared a compromise solution known 
as the Hurst-Miller draft.53 It largely relied on Smuts’ previous proposals and 
it was used as a default text for further discussions that took place within the 
Commission of the League of Nations. In addition, the French proposal of 
Leon Bourgeois was not even discussed and the French regarded this with 
great displeasure.54
The Hurst-Miller draft had 22 clauses and it meant indirect disadvantages 
for British self-governing polities. According to the second article, members 
of the League of Nations were to be represented by envoys or ministers and 
British Dominions were not to have separate diplomatic representation.55 
However, Miller later changed his mind and pushed through such modifications 
of the text so that even Dominions without diplomatic representation could be 
members of the League of Nations.56 Great Britain did not want the League 
of Nations to become some sort of a “super-state” and made efforts so that 
the Dominions would have comparable rights to other countries.57 For this 
reason, Britain accepted the principle of separate Dominion representation in 
52 CURRY, pp. 975–981; G. W. EGERTON, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of 
Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914–1919, London 1979, pp. 
115–116.
53 Draft Covenant, in: BAKER, Vol. 3, Doc. No. 16, pp. 144–151.
54 CURRY, pp. 981–982.
55 BAKER, Vol. 3, Doc. No. 16, p. 145.
56 D. H. MILLER, My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents, Vol. 4, New York 
1924, Doc. No. 236, p. 171.
57 Cf. R. G. CECIL, The Moral Basis of the League of Nations: The Essex Hall Lecture, 
1923, London 1923, p. 21; R. HENIG, New Diplomacy and Old: A Reassessment of 
British Conceptions of a League of Nations, 1918–20, in: M. L. DOCKRILL – J. FISHER 
(Eds.), The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?, London 2001, p. 
169. To critique of the text of the Covenant of the League of Nations TNA, CAB 29/14, 
W. C. P. [No.] 729, R. JEBB, The British Empire and the League of Nations, April 1919, 
ff. [149–167].
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the bodies of the League.58 Subsequently, on 14 February 1919, the text of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted.59
Nevertheless, Miller remained doubtful whether the Dominions were 
actual states and, for this reason, he did not agree with their participation as 
potential non-permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations. In 
fact, he was convinced that Dominions and other dependent territories should 
not possess the privilege of representation.60 The Dominions did not reflect the 
situation adequately until 21 April 191961 when the Canadian delegate Arthur 
Sifton pointed out that under article IV Dominions could not be elected to the 
Council of the League Nations. He considered this to be everything but a happy 
formulation. Hughes, surprisingly, had no objections against it. Furthermore, 
he argued that if the British Empire was one state then it had to have only one 
representative. Nonetheless, Borden demanded that the Dominions should have 
the right to become members of the Council. Lord Robert Cecil subsequently 
assured the Dominions’ statesmen that the intention of the British certainly 
was not to prevent the Dominions from participating in the running of the 
League of Nations. For this reason, they were forced to find a compromise 
solution. The word “state” in the text was to be replaced with the expression 
“members of the League”, which included the Dominions under scrutiny as 
well.62 After discussing the matter with the American delegation, the change 
in concern was adopted and, as a result, British Dominions had the possibility 
to be elected as members of the Council.63 In addition, Canadians also sought 
a certain modification or deletion of Article X of the Covenant, which dealt 
58 BL, Cecil Papers, Add MS 51102, Vol. XXXII, R. Cecil, Memorandum, 12th June, 1923, ff. 
[91–93].
59 Covenant, in: BAKER, Vol. 3, Doc. No. 18, pp. 163–173.
60 MILLER, The Drafting, p. 480.
61 Cf. TNA, CAB 29/10, W. C. P. [No.] 346, The League of Nations: W. M. Hughes, Notes on 
the Draft Covenant, 21st March, 1919, ff. [179–187]; ibidem, CAB 29/9, R. L. Borden, The 
Covenant of the League of Nations, 13th March, 1919, W. C. P. [No.] 245, ff. 1–17 [345–361].
62 TNA, CAB 29/28, B. E. D. [No.] 26, Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation: Minutes 
of a Meeting of Members of the British Empire Delegation, Hotel Majestic, Paris, 21st April, 
1919, ff. 3–4.
63 MILLER, The Drafting, pp. 477–483, 487–493.
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with intrusion on territorial sovereignty of the League’s member states. They 
considered it to be too binding.64 In general, all British Dominions, with 
the exception of Newfoundland, became members of the new international 
organization.65 Moreover, they likewise gained a new international position, 
a position that they had not had in the past.
Japanese delegates Count Makino Nobuaki and Viscount Chinda Sutemi 
negotiated with the American member of the Commission for the Preparation 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations Edward Mandel House, generally 
known as Colonel House, from 4 February 1919. The negotiations focused on 
how to expand the Pact with a passage dealing with racial equality.66 In the end, 
they decided to include it into the article concerning religion.67 On 13 February 
1919 the negotiators presented the final draft of the text. In it, Makino argued 
that the equality of nations was the fundamental idea on which the League 
of Nations was based. Therefore, he continued, it should be accompanied by 
respect for other races and nationalities. Indeed, adopting the Declaration 
on Race Equality promised the reduction of racial and religious animosities 
in the world.68 In fact, the Japanese demanded a guarantee of equality with 
Europeans as a condition to signing the agreement on the League of Nations. 
However, the clause in concern caused ambivalent reactions. Representatives 
64 Cf. A. BRADY, Dominion Nationalism and the Commonwealth, in: The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d’Economique et de Science politique, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, 1944, p. 11; C. J. DOHERTY, Article 10 of the Covenant – Guarantees against 
External Aggression of the Territorial Integrity of All States Members of the League, in: 
GLAZEBROOK, Appendix C, pp. 140–149; G. M. CARTER, Some Aspects of Canadian 
Foreign Policy after Versailles, in: Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical 
Association / Rapports annuels de la Société historique du Canada, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1943, pp. 
99–103; R. CECIL, The League of Nations and the Problem of Sovereignty, in: History, Vol. 
5, 1920/1921, p. 13; MILLER, The Drafting, p. 354; A. J. TOYNBEE, The Conduct of British 
Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement, London 1928, pp. 56–58.
65 R. Y. HEDGES, Australia and the Imperial Conference, in: The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 
9, No. 1, 1937, p. 81.
66 C. SEYMOUR (Ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House: The Ending of the War, Vol. 
4, Boston 1928, pp. 309–313.
67 H. PURCELL, Paris Peace Discord, in: History Today, Vol. 59, No. 7, 2009, pp. 38–40.
68 BAKER, Vol. 2, p. 234; FITZHARDINGE, W. M. Hughes, p. 138.
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of smaller nations welcomed it, while representatives of the Dominions 
rejected it vigorously. In particular, representatives of Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand felt threatened by Japanese expansionist tendencies in the 
Pacific and the Far East. For this reason, they did not want the Japanese to get 
the same status as Europeans. Last but not least, it should be mentioned that 
although the British Government accentuated the importance of racial issues, 
its members did not see the solution in adopting the Japanese request as it 
interfered with the sovereignty of future members of the League of Nations in 
the field of immigration policy.69
In Hughes’ eyes, the Japanese request featured an obvious appeal to 
alleviate Australian immigration laws and to change local “white policy”.70 
The Australians assumed that Americans and Canadians, who practiced 
a similar restrictive immigration policy, would not support Japan’s 
proposal. However, the opposite proved to be the case. As for the British 
Empire Delegation members, only Hughes and Massey vigorously rejected 
the adoption of the clause under scrutiny. Smuts, on his part, did so only 
partially for example. At a meeting of the Covenant of the League of 11 
April 1919, the Japanese proposal did not pass 16:11.71 Furthermore, the 
approved document also paid attention to the mandate areas in Article XXII. 
A few days later, on 7 May, the Council selected mandate powers that were 
to administrate former German and Ottoman territories. The Dominions 
(expect for Canada and Newfoundland) found themselves among those 
powers. Australia gained administration over former German New Guinea, 
the Bismarck Archipelago and areas south of the Equator. New Zealand, for 
instance, was to administer former German Samoa, and the Japanese were 
69 K. ALLERFELDT, Wilsonian Pragmatism? Woodrow Wilson, Japanese Immigration, and 
the Paris Peace Conference, in: Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2004, pp. 547–548.
70 BRIDGE, p. 83; G. M. CARTER, The British Commonwealth and International Security: 
The Role of the Dominions 1919–1939, Toronto 1947, p. 4.
71 Cf. ALLERFELDT, s. 565; BRIDGE, s. 84; P. G. LAUREN, Human Rights in History: 
Diplomacy and Racial Equality at the Paris Peace Conference, in: Diplomatic History, Vol. 
2, Is. 3, 1978, pp. 257–278; SNELLING, p. 23.
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to oversee several islands located north of the Equator – i.e. the Marshall 
Islands and the Carolinas. The Island of Nauru, a well-known major source 
of phosphates, was jointly managed by Australia, Britain and New Zealand. 
In addition, the Union of South Africa was to control the administration 
of the territory of former German Southwest Africa. The Mandate System 
came into being gradually and was slightly modified in 1925. It enabled the 
League to become a guarantor of peace, not a colonial power.72
The position of the Dominions at the Paris Peace Conference led 
to some theoretical (dis)advantages when it came to signing certain 
contracts. If the authorized Dominion representatives signed a treaty, they 
did so with the consent of their domestic governments and, therefore, the 
contracts were automatically valid.73 In contrast, British delegates did not 
confirm the convention only on behalf of Britain, but on behalf of the 
whole Empire.74 On 12 March 1919 Sir Robert Borden sent a memorandum 
to his Dominion colleagues, in which he stressed that all treaties should 
be written in such a style that the Dominions could be considered to be 
equal partners. Borden justified this course of action making use of the IX 
Resolution of the Imperial War Conference of 1917, in which the equality 
of nations within the Empire was highlighted.75 He likewise proposed that 
the names and signatures of the British should be followed by a list of 
the Dominion ones.76 Additionally, the Canadian Prime Minister sought 
72 See A. J. CROZIER, The Establishment of the Mandates System 1919–25: Some Problems 
Created by the Paris Peace Conference, in: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 14, No. 3, 
1979, pp. 483–513; L. L. ILSLEY, The Administration of Mandates by the British Dominions, 
in: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1934, pp. 287–302; A. SHARP, 
The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking After the First World War, 1919–1923, 2nd Ed., 
Basingstoke 2008, pp. 173–174; TNA, CO 886/9/7, Dominions No. 80, Mandates, May 1921, 
ff. [246–275].
73 MANSERGH, p. 180.
74 W. K. HANCOCK, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Nationality 
1918–1936, Vol. 1, London 1937, pp. 67–68.
75 TNA, CAB 29/9, W. C. P. [No.] 242, R. L. Borden, The Dominions as Parties and Signatories 
to the Various Peace Treaties, 12th March, 1919, ff. [318–319].
76 R. L. BORDEN, Canada in the Commonwealth: From Conflict to Co-operation, Oxford 
1929, pp. 102–103.
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to make the Dominions to sign the contracts separately so that their new 
postwar status would excel.77
The ceremonial signing of the Treaty of Versailles happened according 
to Borden’s proposal. Signatures of five British statesmen, representing 
Great Britain, were joined by the signatures of Dominion delegates – this 
meant international recognition, however symbolic, of the new status of the 
Dominions. The Canadian Prime Minister was very involved in the whole 
matter. Nevertheless, the signatures did not come to the fore among the 
signatures of the British. From the legal point of view and with regard to the 
existence of the British Empire Delegation, in which the Dominions had their 
representation, the signatures of the dominion statesmen alongside the British 
ones were superfluous as the British represented the entire Empire on the 
outside.78 For this reason, the Dominion statesmen insisted that these contracts 
did not mean any obligations for the Dominions until they were approved by the 
home parliaments overseas.79 Even though Borden’s intention to use the peace 
treaty with Germany as symbolic recognition of the Dominions’ independence 
somewhat failed, the fact that they won the right to decide whether they would 
or would not sign a treaty meant a certain level of acceptance of the new status 
of the Dominions on the part of their mother country.80 
*
Indirectly, the Dominions acquired the possibility to conduct their own foreign 
policy. In fact, the importance and significance of the overseas self-governing 
polities became apparent as a result of their membership in the League of 
77 TNA, CAB 29/9, W. C. P. [No.] 242, R. L. Borden, The Dominions as Parties and Signatories 
to the Various Peace Treaties, 12th March, 1919, f. [319].
78 Cf. R. L. BORDEN, Canada in the Commonwealth: From Conflict to Co-operation, Oxford 
1929, p. 103; GLAZEBROOK, p. 111; P. J. NOEL BAKER, The Present Juridical Status of 
the British Dominions in International Law, London 1929, pp. 67–83; WHEARE, p. 664.
79 KEITH, p. 154.
80 TNA, CO 886/8/3, Dominions No. 66, D. 22114, Extract from The Times, 11th April, 1919, 
[Doc.] No. 8, f. 16, [79]. 
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Nations. Along with other dependent territories, the Dominions formed the 
British Empire. In addition, they won the right to individual representation in 
the Assembly of the League of Nations, they had the possibility to be elected 
to the organization’s Council, etc. Nonetheless, the international community 
continued to see them as an integral part of the British Empire. The Empire, 
if nothing else, did indeed represented the Dominions in many ways on the 
outside. In spite of all the limitations arising from the Dominions’ status, 
British officials were fully aware that “they were no longer colonies, but 
nations intensely conscious of their nationhood”.81 The fact that Dominion 
representatives participated at the Paris peace talks marked the beginning of 
a new epoch in the constitutional history of the autonomous polities of the 
British Empire.82
Abstract
The First World War represented the biggest challenge and a test of cohesion 
for the individual parts of the Empire. Newly, the dominions were to reach full 
recognition as autonomous nations of the imperial community. Participation 
of the Dominions at the Paris Peace Conference and the issues discussed 
there influenced the status of the Dominions not only to their mother country, 
but also to the wider world. All the Dominions, except for Newfoundland, 
found themselves among members of the new international organisation – the 
League of Nations. In addition, Dominion delegates also signed the Treaty of 
Versailles, which the overseas leaders considered a formal recognition of their 
formal independence on the part of the British. However, in contrast to the 
expectations of the Dominion representatives, a symbolic recognition of their 
new status did not take place and, therefore, the world continued to regard them 
as an integral part of the British Empire, i.e. that the British still represented 
them in many aspects on the outside. The course of the conference, however, 
did confirm that it was not possible to view the Dominions as “ordinary” 
81 Ibidem. 
82 TOYNBEE, p. 83.
Jaroslav Valkoun
Great Britain, the Dominions and the Paris Peace Conference
162
colonies or dependent territories anymore. The First World War strengthened 
the general trend heading towards a broader understanding of autonomy and 
to a more intense cooperation within the Empire.
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